

VZCZCXRO4991
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0782/01 2741403
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301403Z SEP 08 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9192
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1231
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000782

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#) [CY](#)

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: DENKTASH SCION NOT HOPEFUL ON PROSPECTS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: By Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d)

1.(C) Summary: "Turkey is ready to get rid of the Cyprus Problem in exchange for EU membership", Denktash family scion and leader of the center-right Democrat Party (DP) Serdar Denktash told the Ambassador during a September 25 courtesy call. He said that AKP was "very sincere" in its pro-solution stance and support of Talat. Eventual Turkish EU accession, which he himself deemed highly unlikely, would also obviate the necessity for Turkish guarantees in Cyprus and Acquis derogations on freedom of movement. Even the Turkish military was on board, but wanted the continuation of Turkish guarantees to protect Turkey's southern flank. Denktash claimed he supported a solution, but was "not hopeful," given what he termed the "Hellenistic bent" of the Greek Cypriots. If the G/Cs could only accept the duality of sovereignty (i.e., that it emanates equally from both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot peoples), then other thorny issues like property and territory, could be solved. He also made a plea for equal treatment in international for and international media for T/C leader Talat, and warned that the Turkish Cypriots were simply not ready for EU accession. The Ambassador pledged support for the on-going UN-brokered process and urged Denktash, both on the island and in Turkey, to press T/C and Turkish leaders to make public statements of support and flexibility. End Summary.

"Turkey wants to get rid of the Cyprus Problem"

12. (C) Denktash told the Ambassador that Turkey (the AKP government and PM Erdogan) desired to "get rid of the Cyprus problem" to open the door to EU entry. While he noted, in response to the Ambassador's query, that Ankara rejected linkage of the two issues, the road to Brussels for Erdogan clearly passed first through Cyprus. To that end, the Turkish government was supporting Talat and was, as far as Denktash could perceive, "sincere" in its efforts. He agreed with the Ambassador's comment that, despite widespread G/C thinking to the contrary, it was unlikely that the carrot of EU membership could be wielded as a stick against Ankara to wring concessions on fundamental principles.

13. (C) From his own T/C perspective, Denktash saw a positive linkage between a CYPROB solution and Turkey's entry into the EU. For example, Acquis derogations on freedom of movement for G/Cs in a future Turkish Cypriot constituent state could be dropped once Turkey got into the EU. Denktash joked that at that time, the Greek Cypriots themselves will demand derogations against Turkey (regarding immigration of its nationals to Cyprus). He also said that Turkish guarantees might be lifted after Ankara's EU accession provided, of course, that Greece, Turkey, and

the UK agreed. Ultimately, however, he weakened his own points by scoffing that Turkey would never accede. "Too many problems", he quipped.

TGS balances solution and strategic concerns

14. (C) Denktash, whose father Rauf by all accounts here is revered by the Turkish military and has excellent access to its leadership, said that even the TGS wanted the Cyprus problem to be solved, though it was less keen than AKP and leaning more towards the the U.S. than the EU. In response to the Ambassador,s query regarding a justification for a continued Turkish troop presence on Cyprus, Denktash said Turkey wanted a continuation of guarantees both to protect the T/C community on the island and to guard the mainland,s southern flank from attack. Limiting the area under Turkish guarantee just to ensure establishment of the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state, according to Denktash, would be insufficient for those in Turkey who saw Cyprus as a buffer. (Note: Some of Talat,s advisers have told us that, as a last ditch effort to save the solution process, they could accept a limitation of Turkish guarantees to the T/C constituent state, and hinted that Ankara would not oppose. End Note). Barring a solution, however, Denktash said he would oppose even the withdrawal of one hundred troops. He argued that the stability afforded by Turkish troops had contributed greatly to G/C economic growth by eliminating the risk of inter-communal conflict.

NICOSIA 00000782 002 OF 002

"We Need a New Federal State"

15. (C) Denktash said that he supported a solution as long as it resulted in a "new federal state", not a mere "patch" of the "TRNC" on the existing Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Otherwise, he argued, the rights of Turkish Cypriots would be forfeited, either politically or economically. The best way to secure "forever" the future of Turkish Cypriots on the island was through Greek Cypriot acceptance of the dual origin of sovereignty, i.e., that sovereignty emanates from both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot peoples. If that were conceded, Denktash said that his party was willing to renounce unilateral secession. Unfortunately, he said that the G/C position on sovereignty "was far beneath" his expectations, and there was "no common ground." (Note: The G/Cs presently claim that sovereignty is single and indivisible and emanates from the "people of Cyprus." T/Cs fear such a formulation over time will lead to their absorption in the larger Greek Cypriot society. End Note). Denktash complained that Greek Cypriots view Cyprus as a purely "Hellenic" island where the Turkish Cypriots, simply put, have no place.

16. (C) Should the G/Cs compromise on sovereignty, other seemingly tough issues, such as property and territory, could be solved, he said. Denktash pointed out that his party did not reject the right of return for G/C displaced (a core Greek Cypriot demand) as long as it was balanced with the other "humanitarian issues", i.e. with the fate of Turkish Cypriots and others who have, in the interim, settled on Greek Cypriot-titled property. He said that he did not seek an "ethnically pure state" as some Greek Cypriots claimed. At the same time, however, he told the Ambassador that the "vast majority" of the population in the north would always have to be Turkish Cypriot.

T/Cs Not Ready for the EU

17. (C) Denktash was brutally honest over the lack of T/C

economic competitiveness in comparison to Greek Cypriots or the rest of the EU: "near zero." Consequently, he said that T/Cs needed time to prepare for EU accession, and regretted that the preparation process had not commenced sooner, ideally after the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004. When the Ambassador pointed out that permanent Acquis derogations were neither probable nor helpful in the long-term, Denktash agreed, noting that the only area where he sought such derogations was over land sales to foreigners, for which there were precedents elsewhere, without clarifying further.

We want equal treatment

18. (C) Denktash complained that the Turkish Cypriots are forced to "tell our story" through Turkey because of their lack of international recognition or access to mainstream international media. Without prejudice to the status of the "TRNC", Denktash called on the USG and the EU to afford Talat, in his capacity as Turkish Cypriot leader, equal access to government officials during the negotiation process. He complained that Christofias traveled the world as RoC President, "telling his story", while Talat was shut out.

19. (C) For his part, the Ambassador underscored USG support for both the present UN-brokered process and for Talat and Christofias. He said that the Embassy would listen carefully and report fairly, and sought ways, without interfering, of improving the atmosphere around the talks. To that end, he urged Denktash in his encounters on and off the island to call on policy makers to make symbolic, though unqualified, gestures of support and flexibility.

110. (C) Comment: Despite charges, at times deserved, of rarely straying from the ideological shadow of his "Deep State" father, Serdar Denktash this time toed a largely moderate line. Many of the issues he raised, such as the dual origin of sovereignty, the need for Turkish guarantees, and deep-seated fears of Greek Cypriot/ Hellenistic domination, are shared by the majority of mainstream Turkish Cypriot parties. End Comment.
Urbancic